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Abstract 
The most dominant view on professionalism is a sociological perspective. Central to this 
perspective is the idea that the pure belongingness to a certain occupation implies behavioral 
consequences. In practice, however, we see that individuals with the same occupation 
background behave differently. This study seeks to explain why the behavior of professionals 
varies by referring to identity theory and addressing professionalism as professional role 
identity; the perception of how individuals interpret their professional role. Using survey data, 
this research investigates the impact of public service motivation (PSM) and professionalism on 
decision making of veterinarian inspectors working for the Dutch Food and Product Safety 
Authority. The results support the hypothesis that decision making is influenced by the way 
veterinarian inspectors interpret their professional role. In contrast, PSM seems to have neither a 
direct nor a moderating effect on decision making. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For many years, sociologists have studied professionals resulting in one dominant view on 
professionalism, the sociology of professionalism. From this point of view, professionalism is 
perceived as the degree of specialized, theoretical knowledge and socialized, professional 
norms and values applied to specific cases in an institutionalized way (Abbott 1988, Elliott 
1972, Freidson 2001). An additional crucial aspect of professionalism is the concept of 
autonomy or discretion
1
 which results from the application of specified theoretical knowledge 
(Freidson 1994, Steen and Van der Meer 2011, Rainey 2003, Evetts 2003). Professionalism is 
commonly seen as strong determinant of behavior (e.g., Andersen 2009; Goodrick ). Through 
professional socialization - for instance by means of shared educational backgrounds, 
professional trainings, membership of professional associations - professionals take in certain 
values and develop a shared professional identity (Evetts 2003, Evetts 2006). Resulting from 
this shared identity, it is assumed that professionals develop similar work practices and 
procedures, shared ways of perceiving problems and their appropriate solutions, and common 
ways of dealing with customers and clients. In other words, it is assumed that pure belonging 
to a certain occupation has behavioral consequences.  
In practice, however, we see that individuals with the same professional background 
behave differently. Some medical doctors may be very loyal to individual clients while others 
may think more in terms of helping the public at large. Following others, we argue that these 
differences in behavior are related to differences in the way individuals interpret their 
professional role. For example, De Graaf (2003) points out that there is no overriding way of 
conceptualizing one’s role as veterinarian, banker, or charity worker, but the chosen 
perspective is context and individual dependent. Clouder (2003) shows that occupational 
therapy students perceive the profession occupational therapy itself differently, suggesting 
that this occupation implies more than one ideal professional role. Therefore, we point out the 
necessity to approach professionalism at an individual level. Rather than addressing 
professionalism at an occupational level we refer to identity theory and address 
professionalism as professional role identity; the perception of how individuals interpret their 
professional role. 
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 Within public administration, ‘a public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power leave 
him free to make a choice among possible course of action or interaction’ (Davis 1969:4) 
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Another concept which has been identified as relevant drive for behavior of civil 
servants is public service motivation (PSM) (Andersen and Serritzlew 2012; Brewer 2004; 
Brewer 2008; Vandenabeele, Scheepers and Hondeghem 2006; Perry 2000). PSM can be 
refered to as the motives and actions, grounded in public institutions, which are intended to 
benefit others and shape their well-being (Perry and Hondeghem 2008). 
 
This study aims to increase our knowledge of the inferred effect of professionalism - 
readdressed as professional role identity - and PSM on actual decision making. By doing so 
we contribute to the literature on professionlism and to the current discussion on the 
interrelatedness of PSM and professionalism (e.g., Anderse 2009; Andersen and Pedersen 
2012; Lipskey 1990; Maynard-Moody and Musheno 2000; Moynihan and Pandey 2007). 
Empirical knowledge contributes to the debate on how professional make use of their 
autonomy by providing evidence of the effect of PSM and professionalism on decision 
making in hypothetical real life situations.  
 
This article consists of five sections. Firstly, we introduce professionalism and PSM and point 
out several limitations in current literature. Secondly, we provide an introduction to our case; 
veterinarian inspectors (N=258) working for the Dutch Food and Product Safety Authority. 
After describing data and methods, we present our results, discuss our findings and, finally, 
conclusions are drawn. 
 
 
1. THEORETICAL FRAMWORK   
 
Professionalism  
In the sociology of professionalism, professionalism is addressed at the occupational level 
(e.g., Evetts 2003; Freidson 2001). Central to this approach is the idea that professionals 
develop similar work practices and procedures, shared ways of perceiving problems and their 
appropriate solutions, and common ways of dealing with customers and clients. In other 
words, it is assumed that the belongingness to a certain occupation has behavioral 
consequences (Andersen 2009). As mentioned above, autonomy is a cruical aspct of the work 
of professionals. Often supervisors do not hold the same profession as the professionals they 
monitor. Being non-experts, they do not possess the (theoretical) knowledge of professionals. 
Accordingly, they are unable to evaluate whether the members of a certain occupation did the 
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most appropriate thing within a given situation or not (Roberts and Dietrich 1999). This is one 
of the reasons why the information about the quality of the services or products is asymmetric 
and - more importantly - like Gulick (1933, 61) puts it  ‘it is impossible to analyze the work of 
any public employee from the time he (or she) steps into the office in the morning until he (or 
she) leaves at night without discovering that his (or her) act is a seamless web of discretion 
and action’. In other words, there will always be situations where professionals have 
discretionary room available.  
Research approaching professionalism at the individual level, however, shows that the 
behavior of professionals is influenced by more than just one set of overreaching occupational 
norms. The personal interpretation that individuals bring to their professional role matter as 
well. For example, Bucher and Selling (1977) point out that not all psychiatrists have the 
same ideas about their field and how one should act as a professional; nor do all of them share 
believes about the efficiency of competing treatments or therapeutic approaches. Gould and 
Harris (1996) found that despite of identifying with general traits such as ‘caring people’, 
social workers indicate that they are ‘not tied to any particular image’ (p. 229). In an 
qualitative study, Schott, Steen en Van Kleef found evidence some veterinarian inspectors are 
very stict in applying ruels and regualation while others sensitives to the needs of the 
individuals being inspected. According to De Graaf (2003), there seems to be no overriding 
way of conceptualizing one’s role as veterinarians, bankers, or charity workers, but the chosen 
discourse
2
 is context- and individual dependent. More recently (2010), the author identified 
four different types of public top administrators (by-the-book professionals, society’s neutral 
servants, personally grounded servants, and open and principled independent) depending on 
the way they weigh their loyalties to their different masters (elected official, colleagues, the 
public good, moral imperatives, the law, and the organization’s clients). These typologies of 
public professionals matter because they have behavioral implications. 
What follows from this is that the predictive power of professionalism concerning 
behavior is less strong than initially presumed. It is not clear from being a professional solely 
how one interprets his/her professional role and, related to this, which loyalties one is 
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 Hajer (1995: 44) defines a discourse as ‘a specific ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorizations that are 
produced, reproduced and transformed in a particular set of practices and through which meaning is given to 
social and physical reality’.  
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addressing. Thus, the sociological concept of professionalism, as commonly used in literature, 
is vague is the sense that its actual meaning is ambiguous and its behavioral effects cannot be 
explained sufficiently by mechanisms of professional socialization. In order to investigate the 
impact of professionalism on behavior a more individualized conceptualization of 
professionalism is needed; namely a conceptualization that takes into account the individual 
interpretations of cultural expectations tied to a (professional) role. Such an individual 
conceptualization goes beyond the idea of professional socialization implying that all 
professionals within a certain occupation develop a shared professional identity and act 
consistent with it.  
 
In this study, identity theory is suggested as a theory which can explain why individuals with 
the same occupational background show varing behavior in practice. Identity theory offers a 
line of reasoning for behavior by making use of the context and the self as explanatory 
variables. The self is seen as a multi-dimensional construct consisting of a collection of role 
identities; each of which is based on the occupation of a particular role in social intercourse 
(Stryker and Burke 2000). For example, an individual may occupy the role of being a parent, 
friend, a professional, a public servant, and a member of a certain organization all at the same 
time. Role identities are “self-conceptions, self-referent cognitions, or self-definitions that 
people apply to themselves as a consequence of the structural role positions they occupy” 
(Hogg et al. 1995 p. 256). In other words, role identities are the interpretations that 
individuals bring to roles or positions they are holding in society. Roles in this context can be 
seen as “cultural expectations tied to social positions in the social structure that actors try to 
meet” (Burke and Stets 2009, p. 39). The role concept in identity theory shows strong 
conformities with people’s social identity as defined by social identity theory. From the 
perspective of social identity theory, individuals “are perceived as, are reacted to, and act as 
embodiments of the relevant in-group prototype rather than as unique individuals” (Hogg et 
al. 1995, p. 261). By researching how individuals give meaning to the professional role they 
hold, we learn more about how the professional interprets his or her professional role and 
which impact on decision making may be expected.  Based on this, the first hypothesis is as 
following:  
 
H1: Decision making is influenced by professional role identity (the way how individuals 
interpret their professional role). 
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Public service motivation  
Since Perry and Wise (1990) provided the first definition of PSM - PSM is ‘a predisposition 
to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public organizations’ (p. 368) - 
several different definitions of PSM have been published (see e.g. Brewer and Selden 1998; 
Perry and Wise 1990; Rainey and Steinbauer 1999). In spite of this definitional plurality, what 
unifies all definitions is the idea of ‘meaningful public service’ or serving the community 
implying that PSM and public interest are inherently related. 
A large body of research exists treating PSM as an independent variable. For example 
PSM has been associated with job satisfaction, (Bright 2008; Wright and Pandey, 2008) 
organizational commitment (Camilleri 2006; Crewson 1997; Leisink and Steijn 2009), and 
turnover intentions (Bright 2008; Naff and Crum 1999). Recently, scholars highlighted the 
fact that relationship between PSM and performance might be more complex than initially 
thought, leading to a new line of research which includes contextual factors into the analysis 
of the PSM-performance relationship (Bright 2007; Wright and Pandey 2008). Another line of 
research focuses on the antecedents of PSM such employee-leader relations, job 
characteristics (Camilleri 2007) and organizational antecedents (Giauque et al. 2013). 
Despite this extensive quantitative research on PSM, insight into the meaning of PSM 
and into how individuals actually put their PSM  into practice, is still limited. We cannot be 
sure about what kind of behavior can be expected simply from knowing that somebody is 
highly public service motivated. This can be explained by the central aspect of public service 
motivation, namely the ‘public interest’, being a very elusive concept. Following Bozeman 
(2007), there is little agreement on what the public interest exactly. Similarly, Rainey (1982) 
points out that “there are as many ways to conceive of public service as there are to conceive 
of the public interest” (p.289). It seems that there no such thing as ‘the one and only public 
interest’, but everybody has her or his own interpretation of the public interest.  
Consequentially the questions raises: Does being public service motivated imply to support 
efficiency, responsibility, democracy, integrity, transparency, or responsiveness? Following 
Van der Wal et al. (2011b), these public values are potentially conflicting, thus potentially 
forcing individuals to choose one above the other. In order to reduce this lack of knowledge, 
we argue that it is necessary to complement PSM with other concepts and theories that 
provide more insight into the meaning of the public interest for an individual. Only if we 
address the public interest as a context-dependent interpretation rather than an ideal, and if we 
gain insight into what it means to an individual to serve the public interest in a specific 
situation, we can say something about the actual effect of being public service motivated.  
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We argue that through combining the concept PSM with the concept professional role 
identity, the meaning what it means to score high on PSM is clarified. As pointed out earlier, 
the public interest is an integrated aspect of PSM by definition. Individuals who are highly 
public service motivated are committed to the public interest (Vandenabeele, 2008). We 
expect that a high level of PSM will drive individuals to make decisions that are consistent 
with their interpretation of what it means to serve the public interest in a specific situation. In 
contrast, individuals who scores low on PSM, will more easily adhere to a pragmatic solution 
that might involve trading off one’s personal interpretation of the public interest. For 
example, a highly public service motivated teacher who interpretes sees helping disadvateged 
students as an important aspect of her professional role is more likely to work long ours than a 
teacher scoring low on PSM. Put it differently, we expect highly public service motivated 
individuals to behave more consistent with their interpretation of what it means to serve the 
public interest when holding a specific role than individuals who score low on PSM. The 
leads us to the second hypothesis: 
 
H2: PSM moderates the relationship between professional role perception and decision. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. METHODOLODICAL PART 
Sample and procedure 
The Dutch Food and Safety Authority (NVWA) is the only organization in the Netherlands 
where veterinarian inspectors are employed. A web-based questionnaire was disturbed to all 
veterinarian inspectors working at the division Veterinary & Import in the summer of 2013. 
We focus on veterinarian inspectors working at this division since they present a critical case 
Professionalism 
(professional role 
identity) 
 
Decision making  
 
 
PSM 
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to be studied if we want to increase our knowledge of how individual interpretations of the 
professional role influence decision making. Veterinarian inspector dispose of a lot of 
autonomy. The NVWA encourages its employees to ‘inspect with mind and hart’ or to enforce 
‘soft if possible, and strict if necessary’, indicating the complexity and professional discretion 
inherent in their work (Yearbook NVWA 20012).  
 
In order to ensure a high response-rate, the questionnaire was accompanied by a short cover 
letter, signed by the head of the division, which emphasized the independent and autonomous 
character of this study and the importance to participle.  In total, N=403 employees were 
addressed. 269 respondents returned the questionnaire. Respondents who completed less than 
30% of the questions were excluded from the analysis yielding a total response of 64% 
(N=258).  
Following common practice (Pandey and Stazyk 2008, p. 102), three socio-
demographic characteristics are included as control variables; namely position, age, and 
gender. Educational level is not included as an academic degree in veterinary medicine is a 
requirement to be become a veterinarian inspectors. Next to this, we also included the thee 
controls tenure, type of employment contract (practitioner or ‘regular’ veterinarian 
inspector
3
), and additional employment as veterinarian (yes or no) because they provide 
specific characteristics of this case. Proactivity is included as final control variable as 
proactive behaviour is commonly associated with successful adaption of organizational values 
within sociological literature (Ashford and Black, 1995). In Table A1, the descriptive 
statistics of the control variables of the respondents are summarized. Most respondents are 
veterinarian inspectors without specialization or supervisory responsibility (55 %); 63 % are 
men and 37 % are female; the largest age group is between 55 and 65 years old; 33 %  work 
as practitioners on call and 67 % are employed ‘regular’ veterinarian inspector. The sample 
can be considered to be representative of the total population of veterinarian inspectors in the 
Dutch food safety authority.  
                                                          
 
3 Next to veterinarian inspectors employed as civil servants, the NVWA also employs so-called practitioners. 
Practitioners have comparable job responsibilities as ‘regular’ veterinarian inspectors. What makes this group of 
employees different are their terms of employment. They work for the NVWA on call and, besides that, also 
have a different souce of income. Throughout the paper, when we refer to veterinarian inspectors, we relate to 
both ‘regular’ veterinarian inspectors and practitioners.  
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Measurements 
The instruments used to measure the constructs included in this study are summarized in 
Table 3 (section 3). The measurement’s Cronbach’s α - used as an estimate of reliability - the 
standard deviations (SD), and means are provided. All items were measured using a five point 
Likert scale (ranging from agree to disagree). In the Appendix (Table A2), a complete list of 
all items used in this study can be found. The original Dutch formulation of the items may be 
provided from the corresponding author on request.  
In order to deal with construct or factorial validity, two factor analytic methods are 
performed; exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis. Construct validity is an approach to 
assess if an applied measurement instrument produces scores that seem to measure the 
intended construct and its underlying dimensions (Dooley, 2001). The construct validity of 
the instrument measuring professional role identity is assessed by exploratory factor analysis 
since the measurement instrument is newly developed and has not been tested before. The 
instrument measuring PSM, in contrast, has frequently been verified in the past (e.g., 
Vandenabeele, 2008; Kim et al., 2012) and is highly theory driven. Therefore, confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) is used to assess the construct validity of PSM.  
 
Public service motivation is measured by a modified version of Perry’s original measurement 
scale (1996) which is shorter and cross-validated among 12 countries (Kim et al., 2012). As 
the Netherlands were part of this international study, the Dutch version of the PSM-scale 
could be obtained from the researchers. The pilot test, however, identified one items of the 
dimension self-sacrifice to cause confusion among the respondents (PSM_SS2: I believe in 
putting civil duty before the self).  
Both indices of the CFA on our measurement of PSM did not meet the required 
threshold. For this reason, two items (item PSM_APS_4: It is important to me to contribute to 
the common good and item PSM_COM_ 2: I emphasize with others who face difficulties) 
with low factor loadings, were excluded from further analysis. As a result, both fit-indices 
increased, indicating that the adjusted model of PSM can be considered favourably (Table 1). 
The CFI value exceeds the cutoff score of .95 and the RMSEA is below .08 (RMSEA = 0.076 
< .08; CFI = .954 > .95) suggesting that the modified PSM-measurement instruments has 
good construct validity. 
Cronbach’s α was tolerable good for both the overreaching concept PSM (α = .83) and 
its separate dimensions attraction to public service, commitment to public values, compassion 
and self-sacrifice. Only the dimension commitment to public values scored relatively low (α = 
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.56). Since Cronbach’s α reliability coefficients depend on the number of items which 
measure a concept (Dooley, 2001) and ‘commitment to public values’ is addressed by only 
three items, we kept the dimension regardless the low α. 
 
Table 1 Summary fit indices CFA 
 CFI RMSEA 
PSM (original model )  .923 .121 
PSM (modified model)  .954 .076 
Cutoff criteria >.95 <.08 
 
No specific measurement instruments exists which captures the interpretations that 
professionals bring to their job. In order to assess the professional role identity of veterinarian 
inspector we had to develop a new instrument. Following research using identity theory (e.g., 
Reitzes and Burke 1980; Cast 2006; Stets and Burk 2005a), we developed a bipolar scale. 
This 15-items scale captures five different dimensions of professional role identity which are 
drawn from the findings of a qualitative pre-study. Based on 39 semi-structured interviews 
with veterinarian inspectors working at the NVWA and six days of participant observation, 
five different dimensions of professional role identity could be identified, namely commitment 
to economic interest, commitment to animal welfare, commitment to public health, 
enforcement and closeness to the inspectee. Each dimension is measured by a varying number 
of items ranging from two up to four. Respondents are asked to think of themselves as 
veterinarian inspectors and prompt to identify where they would place themselves between 
each bipolar statement. Put it differently, the developed items ask respondents to which 
degree they perceive the five dimensions as important aspects of their professional role. 
Examples of the items include ‘strict enforcement of rules is the only way to reach your goals 
(willingness to enforce)’ or ‘it is important that veterinarian inspectors consider the economic 
interest of the meat processing industry (commitment to economic interest)’.  
In Table 2, the results of the PCA are summarized. Before the results of the PCA can 
be analyzed to assess the construct validity of professional role identity, it is important to 
check whether the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin test (KMO test) and the Bartlett’s test of spericity 
meet the required criteria (Field, 2009). The KMO test indicates whether the sample is 
adequate to carry out the analysis. In this study, the measure of sampling adequacy exceeds 
the required cutoff criteria of .5 (KMO test = .681). The Bartlett’s test is significant (Bartlett’s 
test =.000) indicating that variances of the populations from which different samples are 
drawn are equal (homogeneity of variances). The results of the PCA indicate that the factors 
approximately correspond with the expected aspects of professional identity (commitment to 
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economic interest, commitment to animal welfare, commitment to public health, enforcement 
and closeness to the inspectee). Only one items of the dimension enforcement (Enforce3) is 
slightly beyond the rule of thumb for establishing what can be considered as good factor 
loading coefficient. The factor loading is smaller than .3. Furthermore, item AW3 (I am 
willing to deviate from rules to safeguard animal welfare (For example, transporting boars 
and sows in one truck to keep them quite)) shows low factor-loading on Factor 2. For this 
reason, item AW 3 is excluded from further analysis. 
 The reliability of the separate dimensions of professional role identity is rather low 
(see Table 3); especially the dimension commitment to economic interest (Cronbach’s α of 
.50). Therefore, it deserves closer attention. Further research of the two items “If rule 
enforcement implies serious financial damage for the individual I have to inspect, I find it 
difficult to enforce rules (ECO1)” and “Sometimes, I deviate from the rules in order to reduce 
the economic damage of the individual I have to inspect (ECO2)” shows that they together 
form a “cumulative scale” instead of a scale of correlated items. In other words, finding it 
difficult to enforce rules if this implies a serious financial damage is a precondition for 
deviating from the rules. Following Embretson and Reise (2000), if scales are cumulative they 
cannot be assessed by Cronbach’s α. Rather, they need to be analyzed using nonparametric 
item-response theory for polychromous items. The scale of the dimension commitment to 
economic interest has a homogeneity of H = 0.34, which acceptable according to Schuurman 
(2003). For this reason, we combine the ECO1 and ECO2 and use their sum score as 
instrument to measure the professional role dimension commitment to the economic interest.  
Taking into account that Cronbach’s α reliability coefficients depend on the number of 
items which measure a concept (Dooley 2001) and the number of items used to measure the 
different dimensions of professional role identity only varies from 2 up to 4, the Cronbach’s α 
of the other dimensions of professional role identity - varying between .61 and .66 - are 
considered to be tolerable acceptable.  
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Table 2 Results of PCA 
 Factor 
 1 2 3 4 5 
Eco1 ,590 -,094 ,013 -,264 -,012 
Eco3 ,551 -,095 ,130 -,235 ,063 
AW1 ,392 ,277 -,423 -,067 ,424 
AW2 ,173 ,350 -,690 ,201 -,160 
AW3 ,588 ,067 ,042 ,205 -,263 
AW4 ,293 ,522 -,502 ,209 -,158 
PH1 ,085 ,770 ,315 ,040 -,188 
PH2 ,022 ,513 ,538 -,246 -,310 
PH3 -,005 ,571 ,368 ,010 ,553 
Enfore1 ,490 -,339 ,252 ,459 -,200 
Enforce2 ,560 -,092 ,209 ,464 ,366 
Enforce3 ,669 -,042 ,199 ,267 ,002 
Close1 ,667 -,044 -,013 -,416 -,138 
Close2 ,498 -,102 -,147 -,580 ,088 
+ excluded from further analysis 
Rotation: Varimax 
 
 
Decision making  
Following research on ethical decision making (Maesschalck 2004), decision making in this 
study is measured through three dilemmas. These dilemmas have been developed by the 
researchers and were based on the same qualitative study mentioned above. Therefore, the 
situations are highly realistic and present real-life problems frequently encountered by 
veterinarian inspectors. The aim was to develop dilemmas where the three core values of 
veterinarian inspectors – public health, animal health/welfare, and economic interest - are in 
conflict which each other. The resulting dilemmas are presented below. The original Dutch 
formulation of the dilemmas may be provided from the corresponding author on request. In 
Dilemma 1, a conflict exists between economic interest and public health. In Dilemma 2, 
economic interest and animal welfare are conflicting. In dilemma 3, there is a clash between 
public health and animal welfare.  
According to Wimbush et al. (1997), specific problems increase the likelihood of 
social desirability because respondents might suspect the employing organization to use the 
survey to investigate how employees behave in conflict situations. We hoped to counter this 
effect by strongly emphasizing in the cover letter that anonymity and confidentiality is 
guaranteed. 
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Dilemma1: Economic interest versus public health  
An employee of a slaughter house is calling you in the afternoon to do a post-mortem inspection. It 
turns out that one of your colleagues overslept this morning. The stableman had started the 
slaughtering already without waiting for the ante- mortem inspection by a veterinarian inspector to be 
done. You are a little surprised because usually, the slaughterhouse sticks to the rules. By the time you 
arrive at the slaughterhouse. 15 cattle have been slaughtered without ante-mortem inspection. What 
are you going to do?  
 
1) I certify all cattle  
2) I disqualify the cattle  
3)  I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
4)  I do something different, namely…. 
 
Dilemma 2: Economic interest versus animal welfare 
In a poultry slaughterhouse where you have to do an inspection, an old-fashioned and animal-
unfriendly machine is still in use unloading all the chicken at the same time. Official documents state 
that animals have to be unloaded as horizontal as possible. However, at this slaughterhouse, all 
animals are falling on top of each other. This increases the risk of injury and suffering. You are pretty 
sure that the large number of broken wings is caused by the old-fashioned machine and not by 
something else. You want to do something about this, but you know that colleagues of yours did not 
consistently enforce the rules in the past. Stopping the production process implies serious financial 
damage. What are you going to do? 
 
1) I do not do anything 
2) I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
3) I make a written report  
4) I stop the production process  
5) I do something different, namely………………. 
 
Dilemma 3: Public health versus animal welfare 
At the slaughterhouse a cattle is trucked. You assume that the information about vaccinations is not 
correctly reported. Next to this, it also turns out that the animal’s paw is fractured. The truck driver 
explains that the fracture must have happened on the way to the slaughterhouse. but it is not clear by 
just looking at the animal whether this is the true or not. What are you going to do? 
  
1) I allow to shoot and slaughter the animal 
2) I order to slaughter and disqualify the cattle  
3) I order to shoot and slaughter the cattle and try to antedate the fracture’s date so I can maintain 
order if necessary  
4) I order to shoot and slaughter the cattle and make my decision based on the additionally inquired 
vaccination information  
5) I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
6) I do something different, namely  …… 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
Descriptive statistics of the independent variables PSM and professional role perception  
Table 3 provides evidence of veterinarian inspectors being highly public service motivated. 
The mean score of PSM of veterinarian inspectors is 3.78 which is higher than the mean score 
of PSM found by a national survey of Swiss civil servants (Giauque et al. 2013) and Dutch 
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civil servants working in the subsector public administration, public security, defence, 
education, and academic hospitals (Leisink and Steijn 2009). The means of three dimensions 
(attraction to public service, commitment to the public interest, compassion) are clearly above 
3,5 (3 is the scale’s centre) as well. Only the dimension self-sacrifice is a little lower (3.37). 
All items are well distributed varying from .40 up to .61.  
The descriptive statistics of the different dimensions of the construct professional role 
identity are varied. The mean score of the dimension commitment to public health is highest 
(3.60). The dimensions commitment to economic interest scores is lowest (2.46). The three 
remaining dimensions commitment to animal welfare, closeness to the inspectee, and 
willingness to enforce are in between. The standard deviations of the different dimensions of 
the concept professional role identity are relatively large varying between .67 and .91.  
 
Table 3 Descriptive statistics measurement instruments  
Construct 
 
No of items Cronbach’s α Mean SD 
PSM 12 .83 3.78 .40 
Attraction to public service 3 .58 3.84 .48 
Commitment to public values 3 .56 3.81 .40 
Compassion 3 .60 3.37 .51 
Self-sacrifice 3 62 3.37 .61 
     
Professional role identity 14 .64 3.26 .38 
Commitment to economic interest 2 .48
4
 2.46 .67 
Commitment to animal welfare 3 .60 3.32 .66 
Commitment to public health 3 .61 3.60 .62 
Willingness to enforce enforcement 3 .66 3.04 .94 
Closeness to inspectee 2 .61 2.96 .81 
 
In Table 4 the descriptive statistics of the variable decision making are summarized. First, the 
last response category (‘I do something different. namely…’) is coded. If the answer was in 
line with one of the other response categories, the answer was recoded accordingly. If this 
was not the case, the reactions were either put together as a new response category (provided 
that more than 10 individuals gave the same answer) or were coded as missing. The same is 
true for existing response categories that count less than 10 reactions as these categories are 
too small to perform statistical analyses with (Hosmer and Lemeshow, 2000) 
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 See section 2 for why we held on to this construct regardless the low alpha 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of dependent variable   
 No % 
Dilemma 1   
I disqualify the cattle 128 50 
I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 98 38 
Missing 32 12 
N 258  
   
Dilemma 2   
I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 167 64 
I make a written report 25 10 
I stop the production process 25 10 
Missing 41 16 
N 258  
   
Dilemma 3   
I order slaughter and disqualify the pork 14 6 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and try to antedate the fracture’s 
date so I can maintain order if necessary 
59 23 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and make my decision based on the 
additionally inquired vaccination information 
94 36 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork, try to antedate the fracture’s date 
so I can maintain order if necessary AND make my decision based on the 
additionally inquired vaccination information 
54 21 
Missing 37 14 
N 258  
 
 
In Dilemma 1, after excluding response categories which were less than 10 times chosen, the  
number of reactions is approximately balanced between the two remaining response 
categories. 57 % of the respondents indicate that they would slaughter the animals 
immediately. 47 % of the respondents answer that they would postpone the  decision and talk 
to their supervisor first.  
In Dilemma 2, one response category is dominant. More than 75 % of the respondents 
indicate that they would postpone the decision until they had contact with their supervisor. 
The remaining two response categories are approximately equally strong represented. 12 % of 
the respondents indicate that they would follow the rules and make a written report. 13 % of 
the respondents choose the most drastic measure. They indicate that they would disrupt the 
production process. 
In Dilemma 3, the remaining categories vary most regarding the quantity of how often 
they are chosen. Respondents most often indicate (36 %)  that they would slaughter the 
animal and wait for additional information about the vaccination of the animal before they 
make a decision.  23 % of the respondents would  slaughter the animal, too. However, they 
would not wait for additional vaccination information but rather investigate where the 
suffering of the animal originates from. Next to this, there is also a relatively large group of 
individuals who would do both; waiting for additional information and antedate the animal’s 
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suffering (21 %). Only 9 % of the respondents indicate that they would apply serious penalties 
by destructing the animal right away.   
 
Logistic regression analyses: testing of Hypothesis 1 
Two response categories are given in Dilemma 1. Therefore, we performed a binary logistic  
regression analysis. In Dilemma 2 and 3, the respondent can choose between more than two 
response categories. Multiple logistic analysis is performed to investigate decision-making in 
these two dilemmas. 
 
Binary logistic regression analysis: Dilemma 1  
Before the results of the binary regression analysis are presented, it is checked whether the 
logistic regression model provides a good fit with the observed data. The Hosmer-Lemeshow 
(HL test) test and the Omnibus test of model coefficients indicate the extent to which the new 
model provides better fit than the ‘null model’ without predictor(s). If the result of the HL test 
is not significant. the model can be considered to have adequate fit (Lammers et al. 2007). 
Table 5 summarizes the results of the binary regression analysis applied to Dilemma 1. Next 
to the Logits (the logistic regression coefficients (B)) and the odds ratio (Exp(B)), the HL test 
and Nagelkerke R Square are provided. The Nagelkerke (pseudo) R square can be used as an 
indicator of the effect size of the independent variable (Lammers et al. 2007).  
The logit models show that the dimensions commitments to animal welfare. 
commitment to public health and enforcement have no significant effect on decision making 
in Dilemma 1. A one unit change in the independent variables commitment to economic 
interest and closeness to the inspectee, however, increases the likelihood to decide to 
postpone the decision and talk to the supervisor first (commitment to economic interest 
(Exp(B) = 1.53; p = .036 < .05; closeness to the inspectee (Exp(B) = 1.47; p = .036 < .05). 
This means, if veterinarian inspectors think that considering the economic interest is an 
important aspect of their work and that it is important to keep the inspectees close, the chance 
increases that they postpone their decision until they have talked to their supervisor. 
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In a next step, we include gender. age. type of employment contract. additional employment 
as veterinarian, tenure, position, team, and proactive behavior into the analysis in order to 
control for alternative explanations of decision-making. The results of this second model (for 
more information, see Table A3  in the Appendix) show that the effect of economic interest 
and closeness to the inspectee remain significant (Closeness to the inspectee: Exp(B) = 1.635; 
p = .017 < .05; Economic interest: Exp(B) = 1.807; p = .010 < .05). The two control variables 
which have a significant effect on decision making in Dilemma 1 is gender and age. Women 
are 3 times more likely than men (Exp(B) = 3.009) to postpone their decision and contact the 
supervisor first than to disqualify the cattle. The opposite is true for the effect of age. A one 
unite change of the variable age implies that there is an decrease in the probability that 
respondents postpone the decision compared to disqualifying the cattle right away. Generally 
speaking, Table A3 provides evidence that the dimensions closeness to the inspectee - 
together with the controls - explains 13 % of the variance in the independent variable 
((pseudo (R) = .131). Commitment to economic values -  together with the controls - explains 
14 % ((pseudo (R) = .141). 
Multinomial logistic regression analysis: Dilemma 2 and 3 
Firstly, we investigate whether the ‘new model’, the model that includes the independent 
variable, can be considered to have good fit. This information is provided by the Likelihood 
Ratio Test. The test is based on the ratio, which expresses how many times more likely the 
data are under the ‘new model’ compared to the basic ‘0-model’. In Table 6 en 7, the results 
Table 5 Results of binary regression analysis (Dilemma 1)  
 HL test Omnibus 
Test of Model 
Coefficients 
Nagelkerke 
R 
B Exp(B) Sig. 
Chi-
square 
Sig. Chi- 
square 
Sig. 
Commitment to the economic 
interest 
Constant 
2.992 
 
 
.701 5.177 .023* .030 .400 
 
-1.227 
1.492 
 
.293 
.025* 
 
.006 
Commitment to animal welfare 
Constant 
3.961 .555 2.322 .128 .014 .316 
-1.322 
1.372 
.267 
.130 
.063 
Commitment to public health 
Constant 
11.852 .037 .012 .914 .000 -.024 
1.268 
.976 
.845 
.914 
.833 
Willingness to enforce 
Constant 
1.450 .919 .460 .498 .003 -.098 
-.001 
.907 
.999 
.498 
.999 
Closeness Inspectee 
Constant 
9.169 .557 .4.533 .033* .027 .363 
-1.372 
1.473 
.253 
.036* 
.011 
         
PSM 
Constant 
11.724 .162 2.580 .108 .015 .558 
-2.378 
1.746 
.093 
.111 
.075 
0 = I disqualify the cattle (reference category) 
1 = I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
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of the multinomial regression analysis are summarized for Dilemma 2 and 3. Next to 
Likelihood Ratio Test, the logits, odds ratios, and the Nagelkerke (pseudo) R are provided. 
Again, each dimension of the construct professional role identity is tested separately.   
 
In dilemma 2, again, the two dimensions commitment to the economic interest and closeness 
to the inspectee have a significant effect on decision making. If veterinarian inspectors think 
that safeguarding the economic interest is an important  aspect of their work. the probability 
increases that they postpone the decision until they talked to their supervisor compared to the 
response option ‘I stop the production process’ (Exp(B) = 2.4; p = .013 < .05). The same is 
true for veterinarian inspectors who think that it is important to keep inspectees close (Exp(B) 
= 1.8; p = .019 < .05). A one unit change in the independent variables closeness to the 
inspectee. increases the likelihood to postpose the decision with reference to disrupt the 
production process. The other dimensions of professional role identity dimensions have no 
significant effect in decision making.  
Table 6 Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis (Dilemma2) 
In a second step, controls are added to the model. The results of this model are summarized in 
Table A4 in the Appendix. The effect of commitment to the economic interest and closeness 
to the inspectee remains significant. Control variables that have a significant effect on 
decision making are type of employment contract and position. Respondents who work as 
veterinarian inspector (compared to practitioners) and who hold a position without any 
supervisory responsibility (compared to veterinarian inspectors who are also company 
inspectors) are much more likely to write a report compared to stopping the production 
process. Generally speaking, Table A4 provides evidence that the dimensions closeness to the 
inspectee - together with the controls - explains 22 % of the variance in the independent 
variable ((pseudo (R) = .223). Commitment to economic values -  together with the controls - 
explains 23 % ((pseudo (R) = .229). 
In dilemma 3, the only dimension of the construct professional role perception that has a 
significant effect on the decision making is commitment to public health (see Table 7). If 
individuals view safeguarding the public health as an important aspect of their work, the 
probability decreases that they slaughter the pork and try assess the exact date of the fracture 
compared to ‘slaughtering and disqualifying the animal’. The same is true for the response 
category ‘I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and make my decision based on the 
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additionally inquired vaccination information’. Put it differently, if respondents score higher 
on commitment to the public health. they become more likely to slaughter and disqualify the 
animal right away.  
Table 7 Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis (Dilemma3) 
Dilemma 3 is also tested a second time in order to control if the findings are possible 
confounded by third variables. Table A5 in the Appendix shows that the two control variables 
type of employment contract and team have a significant effect on decision making. 
Compared to practitioners, ‘regular’ veterinarian inspectors are 8 times more likely to choose 
the response category I order to shoot and slaughter the pork. try to antedate the fracture’s 
date so I can maintain order if necessary AND make my decision based on the additionally 
inquired vaccination information with reference to I order slaughter and disqualify the pork 
than practitioners (Exp(B) = 8.068). Individuals of the team slaughtering houses are even 30 
(Exp(B) = 30.428) times more likely to slaughter the pork and try assessing the exact date of 
the fracture than members of the team import. Generally speaking, Table A5 provides 
evidence that the dimensions commitment to economic values closeness - together with the 
controls - explains 25 % of the variance in the independent variable ((pseudo (R) = .254). 
Overall, the results provide some support for the hypothesis that decision making in dilemma 
situations is influenced by the way individuals interpret their professional role (H1). Even 
after controlling for a large number of effects, the dimensions commitment to conomic interest 
and closeness to the inspectee are related to the decision ‘I postpone the decision until I talked 
to my supervisor’ in Dilemma 1 and 2. The dimension public health in related to the decision 
‘I slaughter and disqualify the pork’. The dimensions enforcement and commitment to animal 
health do not have an impact on decision making in situations where different values are 
clashing.  
 
Analysis of moderating effect: testing Hypothesis 2  
Hypothesis 2 ‘PSM moderates the relationship between professional role identity and decision 
making in dilemma situations’ is tested by including PSM as a moderator into the logit 
models which are discussed in section 5.3.1. In the Appendix, the results of the logistic 
regression analyses testing for a possible interaction effect of PSM can be found. Table A6 
describes the results of the moderator analyses applied to the relationship between the two 
dimensions of professional role identity  which showed to have a significant effect in the 
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previous analyses - closeness to the inspectee and commitment to economic interests - and 
decision making in Dilemma 1. Tables A7 does the same for decision making in Dilemma 2. 
In Table A8, the moderator effect of PSM on the relationship between commitment to public 
health and decision making in Dilemma 3 is presented.   
 
Interestingly, the results reported in Table A6, A7, and A8 fail to provide any support for 
Hypothesis 2. PSM has no direct effect on decision making and it neither moderates the 
relationship between professional role identity and decision making in any of the three 
dilemma situations. This is true for both, the dimensions of professional role identity that had 
a significant effect on decision making in the previous analyses and for the dimensions which 
had no significant effect on the dependent variable (commitment to animal welfare and 
enforcement)
5
. 
 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
Measuring PSM and professional role perceptions among Dutch veterinarian inspectors 
Applying the measurement of PSM, all four dimensions of PSM could be reproduced and the 
reliability of all dimensions was tolerable acceptable. It seems that the concept PSM is a valid 
one in the context of Dutch veterinarian inspectors. However, there are some restrictions 
related to this conclusions which have to be pointed at. Based on a pilot study and the the 
results of the conformatrory factor analysis, three items of three different dimensions had to 
excluded from the analysis (‘ATPS4: It is important to me to contribute to the common good’, 
‘PSM_COM2: I empathize with other people who face difficulties’, PSM_SS4: I believe in 
putting civic duty before self). This implies that we are not dealing with a problem of too 
many dimensions. Rather, attention should be paid to the question whether the formulation of 
the items is suitable for every context. Veterinarian inspector are very down-to-earth and 
pragmatic. This might explain the fact that they find it troublesome to identify with items 
which conain woolly words such as ‘the common good (PSM_ATPS4)’ and ‘civic duty 
(PSM_SS4)’.  
                                                          
 
5
 The results of the moderator effect of PSM on the relationship between the role identity dimensions without 
significant effect on decision making in the previous analysis (commitment to animal welfare and enforcement) 
are not included in the Appendix. The results are provided by the researchers on request.   
21 
 
Another issue that needs further consideration is the concept professional role identity. 
The results of the principal component analysis reproduced the five factors that had been 
expected by the researchers based on a qualitative pre-study. However, the reliability 
coefficients Chronbach’s α are low. As mentioned above, this low reliability might be 
explained by the limited number of items measuring the different dimensions of professional 
role identity. Nevertheless, measurements with low reliability run the risk of underestimating 
the relationships between the constructs under study (Dooley, 2001). This implies that we 
might have overlooked the effect of certain dimensions of professional role identity as they 
did not have an statistically significant effect on decision making. Further research should 
address this issue.   
 
Professional role perceptions and decision making by Dutch veterinarian inspectors 
The results of the logistic regression analyses show that three out of the five dimensions of 
professional role identity have a significant effect on decision making; commitment to the 
economic interest,  closeness to the inspectee, and commitment to public health. In the first 
two dilemmas, individuals who perceive safeguarding the economic interest and keeping 
close touch with the inspectee as important aspects of their job are more likely to postpone 
their decision in situations where the economic interest is clashing with either animal welfare 
or public health than to take strict measures and put the inspectee under pressure.  
This means, even individuals who score high on economic interest and closeness to the 
inspectee do not decide to certify all cattle (Dilemma 1) or to do nothing (Dilemma 2), which 
obviously would have been the most logical decision in terms of safeguarding economic 
values and keeping good touch with the inspectee. They do not act against mission of the 
organization. Rather, they postpone the decision; possibly to find other ways to act for the 
benefit of the individuals they are inspecting. This raises the questions if there are at all 
situations where veterinarian inspectors behave strongly against the mission of the NVWA. 
The date provides evidence that veterinarian inspectors vary with regard to the decisions they 
make. However, they do not seem to cross the line and act against the organizational 
objectives and values.   
Other issues the respondents might react to by postponing the decision are, for 
instance, to put right the colleague’s fault (Dilemma 1) or because there was no strict 
enforecement of rules in the past either (Dilemma 2). Unfortunaty, we cannot control for this 
additioanal motives in this study. This is a a limitation of the current study.  
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In Dilemma 3, a situation where public health and animal welfare are under pressure, only the 
dimension commitment to public health matters. Individuals who think that fostering public 
health is a very important aspect of their professional role are less likely to do additional 
medical research or to wait for additional information about the vaccination history of the 
animal than to disqualify the animal from the production process right away. At this point, 
strong conclusions are premature. However, the results give rise to the assumption that 
individuals who focus on public health in their work are very strict in avoiding any potential 
threat to public health.  
 
Including control variables into the logistic regression models did not diminish the significant 
effect of the independent variables. In Dilemma 1, gender had a positive impact on the 
decision ‘I postpose my decision until I talked to my supervisor’. This, however, is not the 
case in Dilemma 2 and 3 implying that it can not be concluded that women generally 
postpone their decisions more freuentially than men. The effect of the two variable 
commitment to the economic interest and closeness to the inspectee to postpone the decision 
might rather be context-dependent. In Dilemma 1 and 2 a lot of money is involved, potentially 
increasing the pressure on veterinarian inspectors. Postponing the decision and talking to the 
supervisor first might be considered as a way to cope with external threats. Another control 
variable which had a significant effect on decision making was ‘type of employment 
contract’. In Dilemma 2 and 3, practitioners seemed to prefer response categories that had a 
direct effect. This might be explained by the pragmatic nature of veterinarian inspectors, or by 
the fact that practitioners are paid per performed tasked. They, therefore, might avoid 
activities that require a lot of (administrative) time. Interestingly, proactivity did not have a 
significant impact on decision making, implying that respondents with a proactive personality 
do not act more in line with organizational expectations than others.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded that the way individuals interpret their professional role has an 
impact on decision making. Individuals who are sensitive to the economic interest and who 
believe that  bonding with the inspectees is part of their job are more likely to postpone their 
decision than to take strict measures. The opposite seems to be true for individuals who 
consider safeguarding public health a crucial aspect of their work. These individuals seem 
very strict in the sense that they avoid any possibly treat to public health right away.  Against 
expectations, we did not find any impact of the dimensions willingness to enforcement and 
23 
 
commitment to animal welfare on decision making. One possible explanation for this missing 
effect might be the low reliability of the measurement instrument. Another reason might be 
that the scores, in particular on enforcement, are effected by social desirability. The necessity 
of  being a strict enforcer is one of the main messages that is continuously communicated by 
the NVWA. This makes it difficult to measure the ‘real’ level of the dimension willingness to 
enforce.  Further research might benefit from addressing this issue.  
 
PSM and decision making by Dutch veterinarian inspectors 
The results of the logistic regression analyses fail to provide support for Hypothesis 2 
claiming that PSM moderates the relationship between professional role perception and 
decision making. In none of the three dilemma situations, PSM has a direct effect. This 
provides support for our critique that we cannot be sure about how a highly public service 
motivated individual will behave as the menaing of PSM is role-dependent. However, the 
results neither provide support for the hypothesis that professional role identity can be used to 
give meaning to PSM. High scores on PSM do not strengthen the effect of professional role 
perception on decision making. One explanation might be that we did not asked respondents 
explicitly how they interpret their task to serve the public interest when occupying a 
professional role. Rather, we asked individuals how important it is to them that they can 
contribute to the values animal welfare, public health, economic interest, enforcement and 
closeness to the inspectee in their work as veterinarian inspector, assuming – based on our 
qualitative pre-study - that these values can be considered to be aspects of the public interest 
as related to the job of veterinarian inspectors. Such assumption might be premature. Future 
research  might benefit from asking respondents directly what the public interest means to 
them when holding a particular role. By doing so, it can be ensured that the values the 
individuals mention to be important aspects of their (professional) role are the same values 
that they relate to the public interest. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
Several conclusions can be drawn based on the results of this study. Professional role identity 
- the way individuals perceive how to do their job - helps to predict decision making. It can be 
concluded that including professionalism - referred to as professional role identity -  into the 
study of decision making is useful to learn more about what drives daily work-related 
behaviors of public servants and to explain varying behavior of professionals with the same 
occupational background. Next to this, the result of this study provide new insights into the 
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impact of PSM in practice. It can be concluded that PSM has no explanatory value of decision 
making. This findings support our argument that PSM alone is not sufficient to explain certain 
behaviors. It seems to be necessary to combine PSM with other concepts that are clearer about 
the meaning of the public interest. Nest to this, the results of this study indicate that 
measurement instrument of PSM might not be universally applicable to individuals belonging 
to a specific professions without reconsidering the formulation of certain items. The 
professionals of this study - veterinarian inspector - seem to experience difficulties to identify 
with items relating to woolly words such as civic duty or common good. Finally, and against 
expectations, PSM did moderate the relationship between professional role identity and 
decision making. Next to the concluding remarks, the results of this study, therefore, also put 
forwards new questions. More research is necessary focusing on explaining the interaction of 
PSM, professional role identity and decision making.  
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Table 2 Multinomial logistic regression analysis (Dilemma 2)  
 
 
Likelihood Ratio Test Nagelkerke R B Exp(B) Sig. 
Chi-square Sig. 
Commitment to the economic interest 4.804 .091 .029    
0 Constant    
Commitment to the economic interest 
   .408 
.657 
 
1.930 
.562 
.035 
1 Constant  
Commitment to the economic interest 
   -1.209 
.541 
 
1.717 
.194 
.174 
Commitment to animal welfare 1.700 .427 .011    
0 Constant 
Commitment to animal welfare   
   3.319 
-.400 
 
.670 
.005 
.224 
1 Constant 
Commitment to animal welfare   
   1.739 
-.500 
 
.606 
.247 
.249 
Commitment to public health 1.211 .546 .007    
0  Constant 
Commitment to public health 
   .574 
.369 
 
1.447 
.640 
.289 
1 Constant 
Commitment to public health 
   -1.473 
.417 
1.517 .363 
.363 
Willingness to enforce 2.499 .287 .012    
0 Constant 
Enforcement 
   .824 
-.148 
 
.547 
.490 
.524 
1 Constant 
Enforcement 
   -.110 
.209 
 
.1.232 
.944 
.502 
Closeness inspectee 8.932 .011 .054    
0 Constant 
Closeness inspectee 
   .078 
.629 
 
1.876 
.919 
019 
1  Constant 
Closeness inspectee 
   -.154 
.042 
 
1.043 
.875 
.904 
PSM .560 .756 .003    
0 Constant 
PSM 
   3.409 
-.396 
 
.673 
.101 
.462 
1 Constant 
PSM 
   1.614 
-.424 
 
.655 
.555 
 .553 
0 = I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
1 = I make a written report  
2 = I stop the production process (reference category) 
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Table 3 Multinomial logistic regression analysis (Dilemma 3)   
 
 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
Nagelkerke R B Exp(B) Sig 
Chi-square Sig 
Commitment to the economic interest .813 .846 .004    
0 Constant  
Commitment to the economic interest 
   1.500 
-.025 
 
.975 
.129 
.948 
1 Constant  
Commitment to the economic interest 
   2.390 
-.202 
 
.817 
.012 
.586 
2 Constant  
Commitment to the economic interest 
   1.583 
-.096 
 
.909 
.11 
.805 
Commitment to animal welfare .485 .928 .002    
0 Constant 
Commitment to animal welfare 
   1.937 
-.131 
 
.878 
.218 
.773 
1 Constant 
Commitment to animal welfare 
   2.767 
-.251 
 
.778 
.069 
.567 
2 Constant 
Commitment to animal welfare 
   2.001 
-.183 
 
.833 
.207 
.690 
Commitment to public health 8.262 .041 .041    
0 Constant 
Commitment to public health 
   6.170 
-1.285 
 
.277 
.001 
.009 
1 Constant 
Commitment to public health 
   5.222 
-.892 
 
.410 
.005 
.058 
2 Constant 
Commitment to public health 
   4.030 
-.714 
 
.490 
.035 
.145 
Willingness Enforce 4.771 .189 .022    
0 Constant 
Enforcement 
   .247 
.379 
 
1.461 
.803 
.230 
1 Constant 
Enforcement 
   .1880 
.008 
 
1.008 
.042 
.978 
2 Constant 
Enforcement 
   1.161 
.058 
 
1.059 
.233 
.854 
Closeness inspectee .651 .885 .003    
0 Constant 
Closeness inspectee 
   .671 
.255 
 
1.290 
.539 
.483 
1 Constant 
Closeness inspectee 
   1.485 
.141 
 
1.151 
.483 
.686 
2 Constant 
Closeness inspectee 
   .721 
.215 
 
1.239 
.511 
.557 
PSM  2.718 .437 .013    
0 Constant 
PSM 
   4.126 
-.705 
 
.494 
.151 
.343 
1 Constant 
PSM 
   4.569 
-.699 
 
.497 
.099 
.328 
2 Constant 
PSM 
   1.832 
-.125 
 
.883 
.526 
.867 
0 = I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and try to antedate the fracture’s date so I can maintain order if    
       necessary 
1 = I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and make my decision based on the additionally inquired vaccination  
      information 
2 = I order to shoot and slaughter the pork. try to antedate the fracture’s date so I can maintain order if necessary  
       AND make my decision based on the additionally inquired vaccination information 
3 = I order slaughter and disqualify the pork (reference category ) 
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6
 The term company inspector refers the a veterinarian inspector that is responsible for the inspection at 
particular company  
7
 For example trainees and senior inspectors  
 
Table A1  Descriptive statistics of sample and population 
 Sample 
 N % 
Position   
Veterinarian inspector (baseline)  141 55 
Veterinarian inspector and company inspector
6
 68 26 
Senior veterinarian inspector 42 16 
Different
7
 7 3 
Age   
<35  25 10 
≥35 and <45 53 21 
≥45 and <55 63 24 
≥55 and <65 93 36 
≥65 24 9 
Gender   
Male 162 63 
Female 96 37 
Type of employment contract    
Veterinarian-inspector  174 67 
Practitioner  84 33 
Additional employment as veterinarian    
Yes 55 32 
No 203 79 
Tenure   
>5  18 7 
≥5 and >10 102 40 
≥10 and >20 54 21 
≥20 84 32 
Proactive behavior   
Low  43 17 
Medium 169 67 
High 38 15 
Team   
Living animals 70 27 
Slaughter houses (baseline)  152 59 
Import 36 14 
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Table A2 Complete list of professional role identity items 
Professional role perception scale 
Commitment to the economic interest 
Eco1: If rule enforcement implies serious financial damage for the individual I have to inspect, I find it difficult 
to enforce rules.  
Eco2: It is important that veterinarian inspectors consider the economic interest of the meat processing 
industry. 
Eco3: Sometimes I deviate from the rules in order to reduce the economic damage of the individual I have to 
inspect.  
Commitment to animal welfare 
AW1: I enforce rules stricter in cases where animal welfare is at risk. 
AW2: For me, what motivate me the most in my work as veterinarian inspector is that I can do something for 
animals. 
AW3: I am willing to deviate from rules to safeguard animal welfare (For example, transporting  boars and 
sows with one truck to keep them quite). + 
AW4: Safeguarding animal welfare is the most important value where I come in for in my work as veterinarian 
inspector. 
Commitment to public health 
PH1: For me, what motivate me the most in my work as veterinarian inspector is that I can safeguard public 
health. 
PH2: If I had to choose. I think safeguarding public health is more important than safeguarding animal welfare. 
PH3: Even in cases where there is no specific rule or regulation, if public health is at risk, I act. 
Willingness to enforcement 
Enforec1: Strict enforcement of rules is the only way to reach your goals (R) 
Enforec2: Sometimes it is more important to enforce rules and regulations based on the spirit and not the letter 
of the law.  
Enforec3: If you want to make a change, it is more important to convince people rather than to strictly follow 
the rules.  
Closeness to the inspectee 
Close: I find it difficult to act as a strict enforcer of rules and regulations if I know that the people I am 
inspecting have done their best to change things for the better.  
Close: I find it difficult act as an strict enforcer of rules and regulations if I know the person I am inspecting 
personally. 
 
+Excluded on basis of EFA 
The original Dutch formulation of the dilemmas may be provided from the authors on request 
(R) reversed  
32 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2 Complete list of PSM items 
PSM scale based on Kim et al. 2012 
PSM_ATPS1: I admire people who initiate or are involved in activities to aid my community 
PSM_ATPS2: It is important to contribute to activities that tackle social problems 
PSM_ATPS3: Meaningful public service is important to me 
ATPS4: It is important to me to contribute to the common good+ 
PSM_CPV1: It is important that citizens can rely on the continuous provision of public services 
PSM_CPV2: It is fundamental that the interest of future generations are taken into account 
PSM_CPV3: To act ethically is essential for public servants 
PSM_COM1: I feel sympathetic to the plight of the unprivileged 
PSM_COM2: I empathize with other people who face difficulties+ 
PSM_COM3: I get very upset when I see other people being treated unfairly 
PSM_COM4: Considering the welfare of others is very important 
PSM_SS1: I am prepared to make sacrifices for the good of society  
PSM_SS2: I am willing to risk personal loss to help society 
PSM_SS3: I would agree to a good plan to make a better life for the poor. even it costs me money 
PSM_SS4: I believe in putting civic duty before self X  
X excluded based on pilot  + Excluded on basis of CFA                        
The original Dutch formulation of the dilemmas may be provided from the authors on request 
Table A3 Results of binary regression analysis with control variables (Dilemma 1) 
 B Exp(B) Sig.   Exp(B) Sig. 
Constant 27.066  .579  28.828  .559 
Gender (0 = male) 1.051 2.860 .006  1.097 2.994 .004 
Age -.383 .682 .031  -.323 .724 .060 
Type of employment contract (0  = VI) .428 1.534 .318  .558 1.747 .189 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = 
yes) 
-.217 .805 .605 
 
-.258 .772 .537 
Tenure NVWA -.015 .985 .542  -.016 .984 .520 
Proactivity  .437 1.548 .109  .431 1.539 .108 
Team  
     Slaughterhouses vs Living animals 
     Slaughterhouses vs Import  
.312 
.300 
1.366 
1.349 
.368 
.532 
 
.428 
.236 
1.534 
1.266 
 
.213 
.613 
Position  
     Regular inspector vs senior inspector 
     Regular inspector vs company inspector  
.466 
-.054 
1.593 
.948 
.320 
.897 
 .435 
.013 
 
1.545 
1.013 
.353 
.974 
        
Economic interest     .571 1.771 .005 
Closeness to inspectee .491 1.635 .017     
        
 Omnibus Test Model 
Coefficients 
Chi-square 22.87, Sig .018* 
HL test 
Chi-square 5.904 Sig .658 
Nagelkerke R .131 
 Omnibus Test Model 
Coefficients 
Chi-square 26.28, Sig .006* 
HL test 
Chi-square 9.85. Sig .275 
Nagelkerke R .148 
0 = I disqualify the cattle (reference category) 
1 = I postposte the decision until I talked to  my supervisor 
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Table A4 Multinomial logistic regression analysis with control variables (Dilemma 2) 
  B Exp(B) Sig.  B Exp(B) Sig. 
I postpone the decision until I talked to my 
supervisor  
        
Constant  16.796  .843  -15.0  .857 
Gender (0 = male)  .123 1.130 .842  .363 1.438 .565 
Age  .192 1.212 .492  .206 1.229 .468 
Type of employment contract (0 = VI)  -1.378 .252 .053  -1.28 .277 .071 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = yes)  
-1.152 .316 .101 
 -
1.202 
.301 .089 
Tenure  -.007 .993 .869  .009 1.009 .831 
Proactivity  .776 2.173 .075  .693 2.001 .110 
Team 
     Slaughterhouses vs. Living animals 
     Slaughterhouses vs. Import 
 
-.684 
-.868 
.504 
.420 
.192 
.235 
  
-.561 
-
1.144 
.571 
.318 
.273 
.116 
Positon          
     Regular inspector vs. senior inspector  .015 1.015 .984  .013 1.013 .987 
     Regular inspector vs. company inspector   -.440 .644 .549  -.323 .724 .658 
Commitment to the economic interest      .733 2.080 .029 
Closeness to inspectee  .771 2.162 .019     
I make a written report         
Constant  
-84.20  .443 
 -
122.6 
1.753 .261 
Gender (0 = male)  .317 1.372 .698  .561 .711 .493 
Age  -.324 .723 .376  -.342 .099 .354 
Type of employment contract (0 = VI)  -2.657 .070 .005  -2.31 .204 .010 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = yes)  
-1.733 .177 .062 
 -
1.588 
1.066 .082 
Tenure  .045 1.046 .410  .064 1.154 .244 
Proactivity  .167 1.182 .774  .143 .577 .806 
Team 
       Slaughterhouses vs. Living animals 
       Slaughterhouses vs. Import 
  
-.558 
.075 
 
.573 
1.078 
 
.458 
.931 
  
-.550 
.136 
 
1.146 
.800 
 
.458 
.873 
Positon          
       Regular inspector vs. senior inspector  -.396 .673 .670  -.223 .108 .809 
       Regular inspector vs. company inspector   -2.231 .107 .033  -2.22 2.135 .033 
Commitment to the economic interest      .759 1.753 .073 
Closeness to inspectee  .350 1.419 .407     
         
  Likelihood Ration Test  
Chi-square 39.321 
Sig .013* 
 Nagelkerke R .223 
 Likelihood Ration Test  
Chi-square. 39.166  
Sig. 014 * 
Nagelkerke R. 220 
I stop the production process (reference category) 
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Table A5 Multinomial logistic regression analysis with control variables (Dilemma 3) 
 B Exp(B) Sig. 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and try to antedate the 
fracture’s date so I can maintain order if necessary 
   
Constant 31.249  .799 
Gender (0 = male) .150 1.162 .868 
Age .210 1.234 .576 
Type of employment contract (0 = VI) 1.543 4.679 .118 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = yes) -1.157 .315 .175 
Tenure -.015 .985 .804 
Proactivity .456 1.578 .452 
Team 
      Slaughterhouses  vs. living animals 
 
.561 
 
1.753 
 
.479 
      Slaughterhouses  vs. import 3.415 30.418 .004 
Positon  
       Regular inspector vs. senior inspector 
       Regular inspector vs. company inspector 
   
.512 1.668 .638 
.963 2.621 .423 
Commitment to public health -1.475 .229 .009 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork and make my decision based on 
the additionally inquired vaccination information 
   
Constant 114.133  .329 
Gender (0 = male) -.031 .969 .971 
Age .244 .946 .340 
Type of employment contract (0 = VI) 1.438 4.211 .128 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = yes) -.309 .734 .696 
Tenure -.056 .946 .340 
Proactivity .545 1.725 .345 
Team 
     Slaughterhouses  vs. living animals 
     Slaughterhouses  vs. import 
 
.784 
1.401 
 
2.191 
4.057 
 
.311 
.138 
Positon 
     DummyP1  (Regular inspector vs. senior inspector) 
     DummyP1  (Regular inspector vs. company inspector) 
   
.377 1.457 .716 
-.004 .996 .997 
Commitment to public health -1.147 .318 .033 
I order to shoot and slaughter the pork. try to antedate the fracture’s 
date so I can maintain order if necessary AND make my decision based 
on the additionally inquired vaccination information 
   
Constant 142.905  .248 
Gender (0 = male) -.942 .390 .296 
Age .435 1.545 .256 
Type of employment contract (0 = VI) 2.088 8.058 .044 
Additional employment as veterinarian (0 = yes) -.072 .931 .245 
Tenure 1.111 3.036 .075 
Proactivity .478 1.613 .557 
Team 
     Slaughterhouses  vs. living animals 
     Slaughterhouses  vs. import 
 
3.051 
.038 
 
21.138 
1.039 
 
.005 
.972 
Positon     
     Regular inspector vs. senior inspector    
     Regular inspector vs. company inspector .220 1.246 .855 
Commitment to public health -.910 
 
.402 
 
.110 
 
 Likelihood Ration Test 
Chi-square 56.838, Sig .006 
Nagelkerke R .254 
I stop the production process (reference category)  
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Table A6 Logistic Regression Analysis with Moderator PSM (Dilemma 1) 
 
 
 
Omnibus 
Test of Model Coefficients 
Nagelkerke 
R 
B Exp(B) Sig. 
Chi- square Sig. 
 8.222 .042 .048    
Economic interest_centr     .428 1.619 .021 
PSM_centr 
PSM_centr x Economic interest_centr 
   .686 
-.065 
1.986 
.937 
.060 
.881 
 8.512 .037 .050    
Closeness Inspectee_centr    .468 1.597 .025 
PSM_centr 
PSM_centr x Closeness Inspectee_centr 
   .662 
-.411 
1.938 
.663 
.068 
.320 
0 = I disqualify the cattle (reference category) 
1 = I postpone the decision until I talked to my supervisor 
Table A7 Logistic Regression Analysis with Moderator PSM (Dilemma 2) 
 Likelihood 
Ration Test 
Nagelkerke R B Exp(B) Sig. 
Chi-
square 
Sig. 
Economic interest 8.159 .227 .050    
I postpone the decision until I talked 
to my supervisor 
      
Economic interest_cent.    .898 .729 .013* 
PSM_cent    -.316 .729 .584 
Economic 
interest_centxPSM_cent 
   .515 2.455 .540 
I make a written report       
Economic interest_cent.    .684 .696 .134 
PSM_cent    -.362 1.289 .629 
Economic 
interest_centxPSM_cent 
   -.254 1.983 .812 
Closeness inspectee 9.324 .156 .057    
I postpone the decision until I talked 
to my supervisor 
      
Closeness Inspectee_cent.    .587 1.799 .036 
PSM_cent    -.110 .896 .850 
Closeness Inspectee_cent 
xPSM_cent 
   .228 1.256 719 
I make a written report       
Closeness Inspectee_cent .    -.021 .979 .954 
PSM_cent    -.255 .775 .744 
Closeness Inspectee_cent 
xPSM_cent 
   .290 .1336 .734 
       
Reference category = I stop the production process 
36 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A8 Logistic Regression Analysis with Moderator PSM (Dilemma 3)  
 Likelihood 
Ration Test 
Nagelkerke 
R 
B Exp(B) Sig. 
Chi- 
square 
Sig. 
Public Health 10.553 .308 .052    
I order to shoot and slaughter the 
pork and try to antedate the 
fracture’s date so I can maintain 
order if necessary 
      
        Constant    1.628  .000 
Public Health_cent.    -1.98 .302 .026 
PSM_cent    .251 1.285 .772 
Public Health _centxPSM_cent    -.868 .420 .372 
I order to shoot and slaughter the 
pork and make my decision based on 
the additionally inquired vaccination 
information 
      
        Constant    2.102  .000 
Public Health_cent.    -.767 .169 .465 
PSM_cent    .044 .203 .1.045 
Public Heltah _centxPSM_cent    .997 .069 .369 
I order to shoot and slaughter the 
pork. try to antedate the fracture’s 
date so I can maintain order if 
necessary AND make my decision 
based on the additionally inquired 
vaccination information 
      
         Constant    1.557  .000 
Public Health_cent.    -.663 .515 .515 
PSM_cent    .515 .1673 1.673 
Public Heltah _centxPSM_cent    -1.014 .363 .363 
I order slaughter and disqualify the pork (reference category) 
